Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

State of Utah v. Thomas Wyman Berg : Brief of
Amicus Curiae
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert Van Sciver; Edward K. Brass; G. Fred Metos; Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
F. John Hill; Bruce C. Lubeck; G. Fred Metos; Attorneys for Amicus Curiae;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, State v. Berg, No. 16548 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1823

This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF

STATE OF UTAH,

U~

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

THOMAS WYMAN BERG,

Case No. 16548

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction in
the Fourth Judicial

Distri~t

Court in and for Utah County, State

of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge presiding.

F. JOHN HILL
BRUCE C. LUBECK
G. FRED METOS
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
ROBERT HANSEN
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

~-v-

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

Plaintiff-Respondent,

I

Case No. 16548

TI!OMAS WYMAN BERG '

l

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction in
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State

of Utah, the Honorable George E. Ball if, Judge presiding.

F. JOHN HILL
BRUCE C. LUBECK
G. FRED METOS
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
ROBERT HANSEN
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTEHTS
Page
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOHER COURT.

1

~LIEF

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

2

ARGUMENT
THE APPLICATION OF THE AHENDED VERSION OF THE
ACC011PLICE CORROBORATION STATUTE ALLOHED THE
APPELLANT TO BE CO~~ICTED ON THE BASIS OF LESS
EVIDENCE THAN THE LAW REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF
THE COHHISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THUS VIOLATING
TdE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF BOTH UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES .
CONCLUSION.

. . . . . . .

3
15

.
CASES CITED

Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 216 (1925) .

9

Calder v. Bull, 3 Call 386 (1798)

5,6,12

Coomings v. Hississippi, 162 U.S. 588 (1895).

7

Coomings v. Hissouri, 4 Wall 277 (1866)

6,7

Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977)

8

Ex parte Hedley, 134 U.S. 160 (1889).

7

.

Government of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d
Cir. 1979) . . . . . . . . . ·

12

Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32 (1866).

13

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1883)

8,13

Kring v. Missouri, 17 Otto 221 (1882)

6 '13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Continued)
Page
Lindsey v. \Vashington, 301 U.S. 397 (1936) . .

7

Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1914).

8

Plachey v. State, 239 S.W. 979 (Tex. 1922)

14

State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).

11

State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986 (1910) . .

10

State v. Somers, 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273 (1939)

11

Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1897).
United States v. Henson, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 46, 486
F.2d 1292, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1973). .
. . . . . .

7

13

STATE STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)A(c) (1953).

l

Utah Code Ann. §77-31-17 (1953 as amended)

4

Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended)

3,9,10,12.1

Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version).

2,3,4,10

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10.

4,15

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 18

4,15

Virgin Islands Code Title 14, §17 . . . .

12

ii
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-v-

lliOMAS WYMAN BERG,

Case No. 16548

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from his conviction by the Honorable
George E. Ballif, Fourth District Judge, sitting without jury, of
the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance where nothing

for value was exchanged.

He further appeals from the Court's

failure to find that the State's principal witness against him
!'as his accomplice and from the Court's failure to require cor-

roboration of the accomplice's testimony.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty on May 25, 1979, by the
Honorable George E. Ballif of a violation of Utah Code Ann.
!58-37-S(l)A(c) (1953), distributing a controlled substance,
marijuana, where nothing for value was exchanged.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of judgment of guilt
rendered against him and a new trial in the above entitled
matter.

Amicus Curiae seeks a ruling from this Court that

Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) cannot be
applied retroactively.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The primary witness against the appellant was one
Jill Hales who testified that she had received marijuana
from the appellant on November 21, 1978 (T. 16) and sold it
to an undercover agent, Craig Wiseman (T. 18).

She was

subsequently arrested and after being threatened with prison
and the loss of her child, she agreed to accept a grant of
immunity in exchange for her testimony against the appellant
(T. 30).

The case was tried on May 24, 1979, and the trial

court ruled that the accomplice corroboration statute,
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) which had
taken effect on May 8, 1979, was to be applied in this
case.
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ARGUMENT
THE APPLICATION OF THE AMENDED VERSION OF THE
ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATION STATUTE ALLOWED THE
APPELLANT TO BE CONVICTED ON THE BASIS OF LESS
EVIDENCE THAN THE LAW REQUIRED AT THE TIME OF
THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE, THUS VIOLATING
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF BOTH UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES.
The appellant was convicted of the offense of Distribution of a Controlled Substance where nothing of value is exchanged, which was alleged to have occurred on or about November
21, 1978.

At that time, Utah law required that a defendant could

not be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice.

Utah Code

Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended) provided:
Conviction on testimony of accomplice.-A
conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated
by other evidence, which in itself and without
the aid of the testimony of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows
the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.
The 1979 Utah Legislature amended that statute to eliminate this

corroboration requirement.

The amended version of that statute

became effective on May 8, 1979.

Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 now

provides:
Conviction on uncorroborated testimon of
accomplice- Cautionary instruction.- 1 A
conviction may be had on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
(2)
In the discretion of the court, an
instruction to the jury may be given to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such an
instruction should be given if the trial
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice
to be self contradictory, uncertain, or
improbable.
Testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated as
required by the provision of Utah Code Ann. §77-31-17 (1953 as
amended) which was in effect at the time that the offense which
is presently before the Court was alleged to have been committed.

Any application of the 1979 amendement of Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18
(1979 amended version) would constitute an ex post facto application of the present statute and would be prohibited by both the
Utah and United States Constitutions.

This is because the 1979

amended version of the statute requires the State to produce less
evidence to obtain a conviction than was necessary at the time
that the offense allegedly occurred.
The Constitutions of the United States and the State
of Utah both expressly prohibit any ex post facto law.

Article

I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution provides:
No state shall . . . pass any bill of attainer,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
No bill of attainer, ex post facto law, or
law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
The above provisions are commonally referred to as the ex post
facto clauses, and was first given judicial interpretation in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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calder v. Bull, 3 Call, 386 (1798).

In that case, the United

States Supreme Court was faced with a question of the retroactive
application of a change in probate laws by a state legislature.
The Court first noted that the purpose for the enactment of the
ex post facto clause, like other constitutional provisions, was
to prevent abuses that had occurred in Great Britain prior to the
revolution.

The type of abuses that the ex post facto clause is

aimed at includes acts that w·ere made criminal by the legislature
after the acts had occurred.

Two important factors in the appli-

cation of the ex post facto clause derive from this policy:
First, the clause applies primarily to
criminal actions;
Secondly, the nature of retroactive application applies to the time that the offense
vras alleged to have been committed.
The Court in an often-quoted passage described four situations
that it considered to be exemplary of ex post facto laws:
I will state what laws I consider ex post
facto within the words and intention of the
prohibition. 1st, every law that makes an
action done before the passing of the law;
and which was innocent when done, criminal;
and punishes such action. 2d, every law that
advocates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was when committed. 3d, every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime
when committed. 4th, every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence and receives
less or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the
offense in order to convict the offender.
All these and similar laws, are manifestly
injust and oppressive.
3 Dall. 386, 390-391.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although the Court did not find the ex post facto clause
to be applicable in Calder v. Bull, supra, in Cummings v. Missouri,
4 Wall 277 (1866), the Court applied the criteria set forth in
Calder v. Bull, supra, and found the statute in question there
to be an ex post facto law because it retroactively made past
acts criminal.

The statute in Cummings v. Missouri, supra, re-

quired people to take an oath stating that they had always been
loyal to the United States.

The statute was enacted at a time

immediately following the Civil Har, thus making the acts of those
ioyal to the con-federacy criminal.
Later, in Kring v. Missouri, 17 Otto 221 (1882), the
Court struck down a death sentence resulting from a change in
Missouri law.

This change allowed the State to refile a higher

degree of an offense after a defendant's conviction for a lower
offense was reversed on appeal.

The Court noted that the change in

the lav1 meant the difference between life and death for the
defendant.

The State had argued that the change in the law occur-

red prior to the defendant's plea to second degree murder and
secondly, that the change was merely procedural and consequently
vras not affected by the ex post facto clause.

both of these contentions.

The Court rejected

It noted that the ex post facto clause

applied to the time at which the offense charged \vas corrrrnitted
stating, "This term necessarily implies a fact or act done after
\Vhich the law in question is passed." 17 Otto 221, 225.

The

Court also rejected the State's argument that the change in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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law was merely procedural.

It first noted that procedural matters

involve pleading, evidence or practice which are not the subjects
of the ex post facto clause.

However, when a change in the law

denies a defendant of a defense that he had at the time that the
offense was committed or when the change affects any substantial
right to his serious disadvantage, the ex post facto clause
~plies.

The distinction between substantive and procedural
changes in the law, since that time, has been the dominate question in cases involving the ex post facto clause.

The Court's

decisions in this question provide some guidance in making this
distinction.

A reduction in the size of the jury in a felony

prosecution was held to be a substantive change in the law.
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1897).

But a change in the law

that placed higher qualifications on jurors was regarded as procedural.

Cummings v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 588 (1895).

Substan-

tive changes with respect to punishment generally involve a change
in the nature of the punishment rather than the means of imposing
it.

A retroactive change in the law requiring a mandatory rather

than a discretionary sentence, Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.
397 (1936), or requiring solitary confinement rather than simple

incarceration, Ex parte Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1889), have been
held to be subject to the restrictions of the ex post facto clause.
However, a retroactive change in the means of imposing a specific
sentence, such as electrocution rather than hanging for a death
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sentence, Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1914), or
requiring the State to present more evidence and follow more
stringent court procedures before imposing the death penalty,
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977), were not prohibited
by the ex post facto clause.
The final type of distinction that has been made deals
with the amount of evidence required to prove an offense.

In

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1883), the rules of evidence were
changed to allow a person who had previously been convicted of
a felony to testify.

The Court noted that this change merely

expanded the class of persons allowed to testify, it did not deprive the defendant of a substantial right which he possessed at
the time that the offense was committed.

In upholding this

retroactive change in the rules of evidence, the Court did not
allow all such rules to be changed then applied in a retroactive
manner.

In making this distinction, the Court stated:
The crime for >vhich the present defendant
was indicted, the punishment prescribed
therefor, and the quantity or the degree
of proof necessary to establish his guilt,
all remained unaffected by the subsequent
statute. Any statutory alteration of the
legal rules of evidence which would authorize
conviction upon less proof, in amount or
degree than was required when the offense
was committed, might, in respect of that
offense, be obnoxious to the constitutional
inhibition upon ex post facto laws. But
alterations which do not increase the
punishment nor change the ingredients of
the offense or the ultimate facts necessary
to establish guilt, but leaving untouched
the nature of the crime and the amount or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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degree of proof essential to conviction
only removes existing restrictions upon'
the competency of certain classes of persons
as witnesses, relate to modes of procedure
only, in which no one can be said to have
a vested right, and which the State, upon
grounds of public policy, may regulate at
pleasure. Such regulations of the mode
in which the facts constituting guilt may
be placed before the jury, can be made
applicable to prosecutions or trials
thereafter had, without reference to the
date of the commission of the offense charged.
110 u.s. 574, 594.
In Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 216 (1925), the Court held that a
statutory change in the rules of joinder and severance operate to
change only the mode of the trial and the Court analogized this to
the situation where the rules of evidence have been changed.

But

with respect to changes in the rules of evidence, the Court stated
that where the change in the law is with respect to the quantum
and kind of proof encessary to establish guilt, then it is subject
to the ex post facto clause.

This is exactly the situation before

this Court in the case at bar with respect to the change in the
accomplice corroboration statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953
as amended) .
Prior to May of 1979, the accomplice corroboration statute,
Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended) provided:
Conviction on testimony of accomplice.-A
conviction shall not be had on the testimony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated
by other evidence, which in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice
tends to connect the defendant >vith the commission of the offense; and the corroboration
shall not be sufficient, if it merely shows
the commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof.
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Legislature in 1979 amended this statute and the law in effect
in the State of Utah after May of 1979, provides:
Conviction on uncorroborated testimon of
accomplice- Cautionary instruction.- 1 A
conviction may be ha~on the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an
instruction to the jury may be given to the
effect that such uncorroborated testimony
should be viewed with caution, and such
an instruction should be given if the trial
judge finds the testimony of the accomplice
to be self contradictory, uncertain, or
improbable.
As can easily be seen, the substantial difference between the two
statutes is that previously a person could not be convicted upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, but now a person
may be convicted on uncorroborated accomplice testimony.

This

means that under the statute in effect at the time that the State
alleged that the offense which is the subject of this prosecution
was committed more evidence was required to be produced than is
now required

to obtain a conviction.

This is exemplified in the

case law interpreting Utah Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1953 as amended).
In State v. Lay, 38 Utah 143, 110 P. 986 (1910), the Court stated
with respect to the accomplice corroboration statute:
Under the statute, the jury has no legal right
convict a defendant upon the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice, even though they
believe the testimony of the accomplice to
be true as to every material fact, and are
convinced by it of the guilt of the defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt.
110 P.986, 987-988.

- 10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This Court went on to note that the corroborative evidence must
' tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense,
be

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and do

rore than cast a grave suspicion on the accused.
Likewise, in State v. Somers, 97 Utah 132, 90 P.2d 273
(1939), the Court cited the accomplice corroboration statute and
ilien stated:
Under the above section a conviction cannot be based on the testimony of an accomplice alone. There must be corroboration
of his testimony. And the corroboration
must be as to some material matter or fact
which is inconsistent with defendant's
innocence. And while it has been held that
this corroborative evidence may be slight
and may be established by circumstantial
rather than direct evidence yet the evidence
must do more than create a mere suspicion
as to defendant's guilt. It must tend to
connect defendant with the commission of
the offense. And it is not sufficient
corroboration to establish a motive merely.
[Citations omitted] 90 P.2d 273.
In that case, the Court also stated that if the State fails to

present any evidence to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice
then the trial court must dismiss the offense.

If the State is

able to present substantial evidence to corroborate the accomplice's
testimony, the jury is to be instructed on the corroboration requirement and the weight of the corroborative evidence will be left to
the jury.

State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941).
It is clear from the case law that the State could not

obtain a conviction based solely on the testimony of accomplices.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,
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Some additional evidence must be presented to prevent the case
from being dismissed.

Consequently, the amended version of Utah

Code Ann. §77-31-18 (1979 amended version) is barred from retroactive application by the ex post facto clause, because to apply
it retroactively would allow the State to obtain a convcition on
less, or different evidence than was required at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, Calder v. Bull, supra.
Cases from other jurisdictions have reached the same
conclusions with respect to similar changes in the law and the
attempted retroactive application of those changes.

In Government

of Virgin Islands v. Civil, 591 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1979), the
Court held that the repeal of the accomplice corroboration requirement which was the same as that previously in effect in Utah, could
not be applied retroactively without violating the ex post facto
clause.

The statute in question there provided:
No conviction can be had upon the testimony
of an accomplice unless it be corroborated
by such other evidence as tends to connect
the defendant with the commission of the
crime. The corroboration is not sufficient
if it merely shows the commission of the
crime or the circumstances of the commission.
Virgin Islands Code Title 14, §17.

The statute had been repealed between the time of trial and argument on appeal.

One of the issues raised on appeal was whether a

conspirator was an accomplice within the meaning of the corroboration statute.

Before this issue could be reached, the retroactive

effect of the repealing of the statute had to be determined.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The

Court held that such an action by the Legislature could have no
retroactive effect as it would violate the prohibition on applying
changes in the law in an ex post facto manner.

In doing so, the

Court stated:
Here the repeal of the corroboration statute
reduces the amount of proof necessary for
conviction. Unlike the permissible change
in Hopt v. Utah, supra, the statute's
repeal would "alter the degree, or lessen
the amount or measure, of the proof which
was made necessary to conviction when the
crime was committed." Id. at 589, 4 S.Ct.
at 210. Since it would-aeprive the accused
of a substantial right that the law gave
them at the time of the robbery, Kring.v.
Hissouri, supra, 107 U.S. at 232.2 S.Ct.
443, the repeal as applied to the case sub
judice falls within the classes of changes
prohibited by the ex post facto clause.
See United States v. Henson, 159 U.S.
App. D.C. 32, 46, 486 F.2d 1292, 1306
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane). Accordingly,
these cases must be decided as if §17 were
still in effect.
[Footnote omitted)
591 F.2d 255, 259.
Likewise, in Hart v. State, 40 Ala. 32 (1866), the accomplice
corroboration statute had been repealed benveen the time the
offense had occurred and the time of trial.

The trial court had

refused to require corroboration and on appeal the Supreme Court
of Alabama held that the trial court's action violated the ex
post facto clause because the change in the law " . . . altered
a legal rule of evidence, and received less testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in

order to convict the offender."

40 Ala. 32, 35.
- 13 -
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A somewhat similar problem was described in Plachey v.
State, 239 S.W. 979 (Tex. 1922).

That case involved a situation

where the Texas Legislature changed the liquor sales statute so
that the buyer of illegally sold liquor would not be an accomplice.
Since Texas had an accomplice corroboration statute similar to the
former Utah statute, illegal sellers of liquor were then subject
to convictions based solely upon the testimony of the buyers.

The

retroactive change in the law in that case occurred between the
time of the sale and the trial,and the trial court refused to
instruct the jury on the requirement for corroboration of an
accomplice's testimony.

The appellate court held that such a rulin£

by the trial court violated the ex post facto clause because it
allowed for a conviction to be had on less evidence at the time of
trial than the State was required to produce at the time of the
offense.
At the time that the offense, which is subject of this
prosecution, was alleged to have occurred, a person could not have
been convicted solely on the testimony of an accomplice.

The

recent change in the law eliminated that requirement, thus
making a conviction possible on the basis of less evidence than
was previously required.

To apply this change in the law to the

appellant in the case in question here would relieve the State of
a substantial part of its burden of proof that had to be met at
the time that this offense was alleged to have been committed.
Consequently, to apply the change in the accomplice corroboration
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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statute in a retroactive manner would violate the appellant's
rights under the ex post facto clauses of both the United States
and Utah Constitutions.
CONCLUSION
The appellant in this case cannot be convicted on the
uncorroborated testimony of accom;lices.

To do otherwise- to

proceed pursuant to the 1979 amended version of Utah Code Ann.
!77-31-18 (1979 amended version) -

would constitute a violation

of the ex post facto clauses of both the United States Constitu-

tion and the Constitution of the State of Utah
DATED this

day of December, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,

F. JOHN HILL

BRUCE C. LUBECK

G. FRED METOS

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
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